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Abstract 
This paper describes the synthesis of Dynamic Differen-
tial Logic to increase the resistance of FPGA implementa-
tions against Differential Power Analysis. The synthesis 
procedure is developed and a detailed description is given 
of how EDA tools should be used appropriately to imple-
ment a secure digital design flow. Compared with an ex-
isting technique to implement Dynamic Differential Logic 
on FPGA, the technique saves a factor 2 in slice utiliza-
tion. Experimental results also indicate that a secure ver-
sion of the AES encryption algorithm can now be imple-
mented with a mere 50% increase in time delay and 90% 
increase in slice utilization when compared with a normal 
non-secure single ended implementation.  
1 Introduction 
For embedded applications, which typically have a 
short product life span, time to market is crucial. Field 
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA’s) are essential com-
ponents to obtain a short design time. Compared to a full 
custom ASIC design, they are cost efficient, easier to 
manage and can immediately be put into operation. Fur-
thermore, they can continuously be reprogrammed during 
and after the design. This feature allows for upgrades, 
which will maximize the product life span and enhance 
the reliability. Yet FPGA’s have an edge over software 
solutions on embedded processors as they have lower 
power consumption and a higher data throughput, which 
are both important design criteria for battery-powered 
devices. 
Consumers attach great value to security related issues 
such as privacy and prevention of unauthorized use. 
Hence most present-day embedded devices have crypto-
graphic capabilities. Depending on the application, these 
features are used for authentication, data integrity and/or 
confidentiality. System designers spend much design ef-
fort in developing secure protocols and selecting a strong 
encryption algorithm to achieve the security level envi-
sioned in the specifications. 
Any security application however, is only as safe as its 
weakest link. Information related with the physical im-
plementation of the device, such as time delay and power 
consumption, has been used repeatedly to find the secret 
key in so-called Side Channel Attacks [1]. Especially the 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [2] is of great concern 
as it is very effective in finding the secret key and can be 
mounted quickly with off-the-shelf devices. The attack is 
based on the fact that logic operations have power charac-
teristics that depend on the input data. It relies on statisti-
cal analysis to retrieve the information from the power 
consumption that is correlated to the secret key. 
Any concrete implementation, including the FPGA, 
carries Side Channel Information. Hence SCA’s have 
been identified as an important open issue related to the 
general security of cryptographic applications on FPGA’s 
[3]. Much effort has already gone into setting up the DPA 
for FPGA’s. Just recently, several research groups have 
independently presented the idea to attack FPGA imple-
mentations with DPA [4],[5],[6]. 
It is expected that general countermeasures, which 
have been developed in the past on the architecture level 
or the algorithmic level, can also be implemented on an 
FPGA. To some extent, they will help in concealing the 
supply current variations. Yet none has ever proven really 
successful and effective in thwarting the DPA. It is our 
opinion that the solution is at the logic level. Indeed, the 
fact that the power consumption of a single logic gate, 
which is the most elementary building stone of the com-
plete encryption module, is controlled by both the logic 
value and the sequence of its input signals forms the basis 
of DPA. 
We have previously presented a logic level design 
methodology to implement a secure DPA resistant crypto 
processor on FPGA [7]. The methodology can easily be 
integrated in a common automated FPGA design flow. 
The technique combines standard FPGA building blocks 
to make secure compound standard cells, which have a 
reduced power signature. The compound cells mimic cus-
tom designed standard cells that have been used to thwart 
DPA [8]. In this manuscript, we study the synthesis as-
pects in order to reduce the area consumption and time 
delay.  
The next section briefly introduces Wave Dynamic 
Differential Logic (WDDL). WDDL is the cornerstone of 
the logic level design methodology for a secure DPA 
  
proof design. Section 3 discusses a technique to combine 
several compound WDDL gates into 1 slice. This reduces 
the area consumption and time delay. Section 4 describes 
the clustering procedure of the synthesis methodology. In 
section 5, a secure digital design flow is presented to-
gether with detailed instructions in order to implement the 
design flow with available EDA tools. In section 6, an 
experiment is setup in which the performance of the 
methodology is evaluated. Finally a conclusion will be 
formulated.  
For this work, we have used the Virtex-II FPGA as our 
implementation platform [9]. The concepts behind the 
synthesis methodology however, are universal and can be 
applied on any FPGA product.  
2 Wave Dynamic Differential Logic 
The power consumption of traditional standard cells 
and logic is dependent on the signal activity, both the 
transitions and the sequence. This is the fundamental rea-
son information is leaked through the power supply and 
DPA attacks are possible. To address this problem we 
have introduced a family of secure compound standard 
cells, referred to as Wave Dynamic Differential Logic [7]. 
A WDDL gate uses a fixed amount of charge for every 
transition and has for that reason at all times a constant 
power consumption independent of the signal transitions. 
It has the extra advantage that it does not use custom de-
signed standard cells or advanced circuit techniques and is 
as a result also applicable to FPGA.  
WDDL is a Dynamic and Differential Logic (DDL). A 
Differential Logic family uses the true and the false repre-
sentation of the input signals to generate the true and false 
representation of the output signal. A Dynamic Logic 
family alternates precharge and evaluation phases, in 
which both outputs are precharged to ‘1’ and exactly 1 of 
the 2 outputs is evaluated to ‘0’ respectively. Conse-
quently, DDL charges in every cycle a capacitance. 
The basic building block of a Virtex-II FPGA is 
known as a slice and consists of two 4-input, 1-output 
look up tables (LUT’s), some multiplexers and registers 
[9]. A compound WDDL standard cell occupies 1 slice of 
which both LUT’s are used, 1 for each output. Figure 1 
shows the LUT definition and allocation of the secure 
WDDL AND- and OR-gate implementation. Letters ‘G’ 
and ‘F’ stand for the G-LUT and F-LUT respectively, 
which are the denominations for the LUT’s of the Virtex-
II FPGA.  
The set of secure compound logic gates is restricted to 
the WDDL AND- and OR-gates. Since any logic function 
in Boolean algebra can be implemented with the and-, or- 
and invert-operator and given that the compound gates 
have differential outputs, this library is sufficient to im-
plement any digital design. The library size has been re-
stricted in order to assure that every compound standard 
cell of an arbitrary logic function has exactly 1 output 
transition per cycle [7]. Only if each gate has a switching 
factor of 100%, it is possible to have an input independent 
power consumption. 
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Figure 1. LUT definition and allocation of secure 
WDDL gates: AND-gate (left); and OR-gate (right) 
The precharge phase of this logic is unique. A module 
in WDDL precharges without distributing the precharge 
signal to each individual gate as is normally done in a 
dynamic logic style. As shown in Fig. 1, each WDDL 
gate consists of a parallel combination of a single ended 
and-gate and a single ended or-gate. Whenever the inputs 
to these gates are pre-‘dis-charged to ‘0’ the output will 
pre-’dis’-charge to ‘0’ as well. During the precharge 
phase, the input vector of the design is set at all ‘0’s and 
the module calculates the result. Each individual gate will 
eventually have all its inputs at ‘0’; evaluate its output to 
‘0’ and pass this ‘0’ value to the next gate. One could say 
that the precharge signal travels over the FPGA as a ‘0’-
wave, hence Wave DDL. 
Besides that each compound standard cell has exactly 
1 output transition per cycle, it is essential that the stan-
dard cell always charges ideally the same load capaci-
tance. The load capacitance consists out of the intercon-
nect capacitances of the wires that run between 2 gates 
and out of the intrinsic capacitances of the in- and output 
pins of the gates. Both LUT’s actually have the same 
structure and the capacitances at the corresponding differ-
ential input signals are alike just as the capacitances at the 
output pins [10]. There will however be a difference in 
the interconnect capacitance due to routing variations 
between the two output signals. In order to minimize this 
effect the 2 LUT’s, which make up a compound standard 
cell, are placed adjacent and in the same slice as in Figure 
1. By doing this the differential signals need to travel the 
same distance to the gate they connect to.  
Experimental results have shown that WDDL is an ef-
ficient technique to achieve a reduced power signature of 
FPGA implementations [7]. By way of illustration, Figure 
2 shows a measured output voltage transient for 10 clock 
cycles of a balanced XOR-tree test circuit. Measurements 
are performed with a HP 54542C oscilloscope. The proto-
typing board is the Xilinx Virtex-II Development Kit by 
Avnet Design Services [11]. The figure shows that the 
non secure single ended design suffers from glitches, 
which are the spurious signal transitions. Even partial 
  
glitches have a significant contribution in the dynamic 
power dissipation. The WDDL implementation on the 
other hand, has as expected only one transition. Whenever 
the output out does not switch, the differential output out  
switches. 
 
Figure 2. Measurement of output transient: single 
ended design (top); and WDDL implementation (bot-
tom) 
3 Slice Compaction  
Currently, 2 LUT’s are used to build a compound 
WDDL gate. Each LUT is needed to generate one of the 
differential outputs. It is however, possible to add more 
functionality, or in other words more logic gates, into 
each LUT. A restricted combination of compound logic 
gates will result in a new compound logic gate with the 
same Dynamic Differential behavior. This practice will 
reduce the area and timing requirements. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show an example. Figure 3 (left) 
depicts the single ended logic function to be implemented. 
The WDDL implementation that results from our original 
methodology is shown in Figure 3 (right). In this design 
each gate is replaced by its corresponding WDDL gate. In 
total, 6 slices are occupied. The logic depth is 3.  
For transparency of the figure, Figure 3 (right) is re-
peated in Figure 4 (left). Yet the F-LUT’s have been col-
ored light gray. This reveals that the implementation can 
actually be divided into two distinct components, which 
contain the G-LUT’s and F-LUT’s respectively.  
The two parts are also dual. One component can be de-
rived from the other by inverting the inputs and by rede-
fining each LUT from the and- and or operator to the or- 
and and-operator respectively. The G-LUT’s calculate the 
true output, the F-LUT’s the false output. Furthermore, 
since the original module is implemented in WDDL, only 
1 output will have a switching event in any given clock 
cycle. As a result, the collection of G-LUT’s and the col-
lection of F-LUT’s can be considered as 1 large G-LUT 
and 1 large F-LUT respectively. Or in other words, the 
entire module behaves as one WDDL gate. 
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Figure 3. WDDL design procedure: original single 
ended logic function (left); and DPA proof implemen-
tation (right) 
This observation is accurate for a module of any given 
size, including submodules. A cluster formed by an arbi-
trary collection of G-LUT’s and the cluster formed by the 
corresponding F-LUT’s behave as a compound WDDL-
gate and can in fact be implemented as 1 compound 
WDDL-gate in the 2 adjacent LUT’s of a slice. A LUT on 
the Virtex-II platform has 4 inputs and 1 output. Here, the 
clusters can have at most 4 inputs and 1 output.  
Figure 4 (right) shows the implementation after clus-
tering. This implementation occupies only 2 slices and 
has a logical depth of 2. Recall that the original WDDL 
implementation requires 6 slices and has a logical depth 
of 3. 
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Figure 4. Compaction through clustering: original 
WDDL implementation (left); and clustered WDDL im-
plementation (right) 
The WDDL combinatorial logic should be compacted 
according to the clustering-idea presented in Figure 4. 
The rest of this work describes the design flow to perform 
synthesis for an FPGA implementation of DPA-proof 
combinatorial logic.  
out 
out out 
  
4 Logic Synthesis 
The kernel of DPA-proof logic synthesis is a clustering 
algorithm. Given a DPA-proof implementation consisting 
solely out of secure compound AND- and OR-gates, the 
algorithm partitions the implementation in groups of 
LUT’s with 4 or less distinct inputs and 1 output. Each 
group will form together with their corresponding dual 
group a secure compound gate and will be mapped onto 
adjacent LUT’s within the same slice.  
4.1 Clustering Challenges 
A group of LUT’s can be divided into many partitions. 
Certain partitions are more advantageous in area con-
sumption and time delay than others. In order to partition 
the gates appropriately, several issues should be consid-
ered. 
A small area is the primary design criterion for most 
implementations. The area consumption is proportional to 
the total number of LUT’s, or in other words the number 
of groups in the partitioning. For high speed designs on 
the other hand, a small time delay is critical. The time 
delay is proportional to the critical path, which is defined 
by a combination of the logical depth and the fanout of 
the LUT’s. The fanout of a LUT, or in other words a 
group in the partitioning, is the number of LUT’s that are 
driven by the output of the LUT.  
An exhaustive search is guaranteed to find the global 
optimum. Yet this will be very computational intensive 
for a medium to large design. A heuristic search is a more 
appropriate approach. In this case, the degree of compac-
tion will be influenced by the traversal order of the gates. 
Clusters that have been defined in the initial phase, affect 
the clustering in the subsequent phase. Figure 5, which for 
clarity only shows the G-LUT’s, depicts 2 partitions. 
Figure 5 (right), where the clustering is carried out from 
the output backwards to the inputs, requires twice as 
much slices then the optimal clustering depicted at the 
left.  
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Figure 5. Influence of initial cluster on degree of com-
paction (only G-LUT’s shown): left-to-right traversal 
(left); and right-to-left traversal (right)  
The introduction of redundancy may also reduce the 
total number of clusters. Figure 6, which for clarity only 
shows the G-LUT’s, provides an example. The straight-
forward clustering, which is depicted in Figure 6 (left) 
requires 3 slices. On the other hand, when the upper OR-
gate is duplicated, only 2 slices are necessary. This is 
shown at the right. 
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Figure 6. Increased compaction through introduction 
of redundancy (only G-LUT’s shown): without redun-
dancy (left); and with redundancy (right) 
The following subsection describes an efficient and 
simple procedure to perform the clustering.  
4.2 Clustering Procedure  
Figure 4 (right), which depicts the optimized DPA-
proof implementation, could also have been obtained 
through a simple transformation of the synthesized single 
ended FPGA implementation. As can be seen in Figure 7, 
the clustered implementation is a parallel combination of 
the synthesized single ended FPGA implementation and 
the dual of this single ended implementation. Between the 
optimized single ended implementation and the DPA-
proof implementation there is now an overhead of a factor 
of 2 in the area consumption and if wire delays remain 
unaffected, no overhead in the time delay. 
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Figure 7. Clustering through transformation: synthe-
sized single ended design (left); and WDDL implemen-
tation as parallel combination of synthesized single 
ended design and its dual 
This means that we can use existing synthesizing tools 
for FPGA’s to cope with the clustering and its challenges. 
These EDA tools have been developed for years and are 
  
being improved continuously. The tools have for instance 
appropriate algorithms, cost functions and stopping crite-
ria for heuristic searches and will introduce redundancy. 
The design can be optimized for many specific applica-
tions such as minimum area or maximum speed. 
Yet to implement an arbitrary logic function, several 
inversions may be necessary. An issue associated with 
these inversions prohibits a straightforward implementa-
tion of this technique. 
This is best seen with an example. Figure 8 (A) shows 
a single ended design implemented with the basic library 
of and-, or-, and inverter-gates. The synthesized single 
ended FPGA implementation is shown in Figure 8 (B). 
Note that inside 1 LUT, there is an inversion. This is not a 
good partitioning. The precharge ‘0’ at the input of the 
inverter is propagated as a ‘1’ and consequently at least 1 
of the 2 dual LUT’s will have a ‘1’ at the output during 
the precharge phase. Hence, the precharge wave is halted.  
The WDDL implementation obtained through to the 
original design methodology is shown in Figure 8 (C). 
Here the inverters have been removed. Instead the outputs 
of the secure compound gate that precedes the inverter 
have been exchanged. Now, there is no inverter present 
anymore to halt the precharge wave. This procedure how-
ever, interconnects the G- and F-LUT’s. The far right 
and-gate, implemented in the G-LUT, is driven by both a 
G-LUT and an F-LUT. This would imply that it is neces-
sary to take both G- and F-LUT’s into consideration dur-
ing the clustering and that only steppingstone C is a valid 
approach. 
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Figure 8. Inversion mixes G-LUT’s and F-LUT’s: arbi-
trary logic fuanction with inversion (A); synthesized 
single ended design (B); and original WDDL imple-
mentation (C) 
Fortunately, a small change in the design methodology 
allows using steppingstone B to find the compacted ver-
sion of steppingstone C. We propose the methodology 
depicted in Figure 9 to synthesize secure FPGA imple-
mentations. There are 4 main stages: 
1. The combinatorial logic is synthesized with a limited 
standard cell library. The library contains the and-, or- 
and invert-operator. This step is in common with the 
original DPA-proof design methodology.  
2. The intermediate design is stripped off the inverter-
gates. The input of each inverter becomes a global 
output; the output of each inverter becomes a global 
input.  
3. The intermediate design without inversions is synthe-
sized for FPGA implementation.  
4. The design is doubled. Each LUT of the intermediate 
design is implemented in a G-LUT, the dual of the 
LUT is implemented in the adjacent F-LUT. Finally, 
the in- and outputs resulting from stripping the invert-
ers in stage 2 are reconnected. The inversions are es-
tablished by switching the differential connections. 
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Figure 9. Steppingstones for synthesis of DPA-proof 
combinatorial logic for FPGA implementations 
5 Secure Digital Design Flow: Detailed De-
scription 
Figure 10 shows the adapted secure digital design flow 
that implements secure DPA resistant FPGA logic with 
the synthesis procedure derived in the previous sections. 
In synchronous logic, the logic design of a module can be 
done with a standard hardware description language, such 
as Verilog or VHDL. Synthesis is done with a subset of 
the standard cell library. Subsequently, a script, e.g. in 
PERL or AWK, parses the netlist and removes the invert-
ers. This netlist is synthesized by a synthesize tool for 
FPGA implementations. The resulting netlist is parsed. 
Each LUT is doubled. This means that the dual of each 
LUT will be placed in the adjacent LUT and is connected 
  
with the inverted signals. The inversions that have been 
stripped out previously are reestablished by switching the 
appropriate lines. Finally, this netlist is read in by the syn-
thesize tool for FPGA implementations to Place & Route 
the design. At the end, the programming file can be gen-
erated. 
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Figure 10. Adapted secure digital design flow for 
FPGA’s. 
We will now present a detailed description of how cer-
tain EDA tools are used appropriately for our specific 
design objectives. Only the steps that were not obvious or 
simple are discussed. Note that we do not advocate the 
use of any specific tool; many other tools could have been 
used.  
We have used DesignAnalyzer from Synopsys for step 
1. In this tool, it is possible to restrict the library by set-
ting the set_dont_use variable for all gates of the library 
except the 3 gates. 
We have used the XST Verilog design flow of ISE of 
Xilinx to synthesize the FPGA implementation in step 3. 
The translate step generates a Verilog netlist that can eas-
ily be parsed. This netlist consists out of declarations of 
primitive modules of the device. Figure 11 shows how the 
declarations are transformed from single ended LUT’s to 
WDDL gates. The first expression defines the behavior of 
the LUT. To find the dual expression for the F-LUT, each 
bit of the binary representation is inverted and the order of 
the bits is reversed. The second expression defines the 
hierarchical subset of the LUT. The subset name should 
be unique for every WDDL gate. Finally in the third ex-
pression, the LUT’s are placed in adjacent LUT’s of a 
slice. This is done by setting the relative location state-
ment of both LUT’s, which belong to the same hierarchi-
cal subset, to X0Y0.  
 
 
... 
 defparam LUT_37.INIT = 16'hC800; 
X_LUT4 LUT_37(.ADR0(n7), .ADR1(n4), .ADR2(n3), .ADR3(n8), .O(n41)); 
... 
 
 
 
 
... 
 // synthesis attribute INIT of LUT_37 is "C800"; 
 // synthesis attribute HU_SET of LUT_37 is "SLICE_37"; 
 // synthesis attribute rloc of LUT_37 is "X0Y0"; 
LUT4 LUT_37(.I0(n7), .I1(n4), .I2(n3), .I3(n8), .O(n41)); 
 // synthesis attribute INIT of LUT_37B is "FFEC" 
 // synthesis attribute HU_SET of LUT_37B is "SLICE_37"; 
 // synthesis attribute rloc of LUT_37B is "X0Y0"; 
LUT4 LUT_37B(.I0(n7B), .I1(n4B), .I2(n3B), .I3(n8B), .O(n41B)); 
... 
 
Figure 11. Netlist transformation: original single 
ended LUT declaration (top); and declaration of WDDL 
gate (bottom) 
6 Experimental Results 
Many block ciphers are based on the sequential appli-
cation of confusion and diffusion. Confusion is typically 
provided by some form of substitution and is executed by 
so-called substitution boxes. These operations are often 
the main components of an encryption algorithm and are 
responsible for the largest share of the area consumption 
and time delay. We implemented each substitution-box of 
3 prevalent encryption algorithms, which are the Kasumi 
encryption algorithm [11], the DES encryption algorithm 
[13] and the AES encryption algorithm. [14]. Kasumi is 
the encryption algorithm in 3G cellular standard. DES and 
AES have originally been developed to protect sensitive 
non-classified data of the US federal administration and 
are now used in a broad range of applications. 
For each substitution box, 3 designs have been imple-
mented: (1) “original WDDL”, which is the DPA-proof 
implementation resulting from the original design meth-
odology; (2) “Differential synthesis”, which is the result 
of a straightforward synthesis of the differential netlist of 
the original WDDL implementation; and (3) “synthesized 
WDDL”, which is the result of a compaction of the origi-
nal WDDL logic according to the synthesis methodology 
discussed in this work.  
The difference between the original WDDL 
implementation and the Differential synthesis 
implementation is that the latter has only behavioral 
information of the module. The synthesis tool only knows 
what are the in- and outputs and how to calculate the 
outputs from the inputs. The tool is free to implement 
this, or in other words to map the functionality onto the 
LUT’s, how it wants as long as the outputs are correct. 
For the original WDDL implementation on the other 
hand, we have done the synthesis step and the mapping 
step ourselves. Strictly speaking, the tool is only involved 
with the Place & Route step.  
  
The Differential synthesis implementation has been 
implemented to have a benchmark circuit. Note that this 
implementation does not have Dynamic Differential be-
havior and is certainly not DPA proof. Many of the Dif-
ferential synthesis implementations require an odd num-
ber of LUT’s. Therefore they can never have the same 
number of switching events in every cycle.  
The programming files have been generated for a 
xc2v1000 device of the Virtex2 family with a bg575 
package and speed grade -6. Synthesis steps 1 and 3 and 
Place & Route have been done with the default settings of 
the different tools. This means that the designs are opti-
mized for speed and with normal effort. Place & Route 
has been done with the same pin locations for each im-
plementation of an encryption algorithm.  
For each implementation, we calculated the slice utili-
zation, which denotes the number of slices occupied by 
the design and the delay of the critical path. The timing 
report of the Place & Route tool only gives an estimate of 
the delay between the input and output pins. The numbers 
that we present have been adjusted for the intrinsic delay 
of the input and output buffer. These delays are sub-
tracted, as they are independent of the delay of the mod-
ules. The delay numbers include the influence of the in-
terconnect wireloads. They have been obtained after Place 
& Route.  
Figure 12 shows the slice utilization for the 8 Sboxes 
of the DES algorithm. There is an almost constant reduc-
tion of a factor 2 between the original WDDL design and 
the synthesized design. It is quite remarkable that there is 
also an important difference between the benchmark im-
plementation and the compacted WDDL implementation. 
The Differential synthesis implementation requires up to 
25% more slices then the synthesized WDDL implemen-
tation.  
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Figure 12. DES algorithm: slice utilization of substitu-
tion boxes 
We suppose that, even though the Differential synthe-
sis implementation has not the stringent constraints to 
generate Dynamic and Differential logic, it performs 
worse because the compacted WDDL has been imple-
mented with the knowledge that this is a dual module and 
that the in and output signals are differential signals.  
Table I presents the slice utilization for the AES and 
the Kasumi algorithm. The reduction factors are 2.4 and 
1.7 for the AES algorithm and the Kasumi algorithm re-
spectively. For the Kasumi algorithm, the results of the 
Differential synthesis are as good and better than the ones 
after compaction. The Kasumi algorithm incorporates 
many xor operations. Since these operations are inverting 
operations, it is hard to generate large clusters.  
Table I. AES and Kasumi algorithm: slice utiliza-
tion of substitution boxes 
 original 
WDDL 
Differential 
synthesis 
synthesized 
WDDL 
AES-Sbox 797 357 327 
Kasumi-S7 249 142 142 
Kasumi-S9 303 157 171 
 
Security never comes for free. We have also imple-
mented a single ended version of the modules. There is an 
increase of a factor 5 for the DES and the Kasumi algo-
rithm The DPA proof AES implementation however, only 
requires 1.9 times the slices of the single ended imple-
mentation. 
Figure 13 and Table II present the critical path delays. 
There is a reduction in time delay between the original 
WDDL implementation and the synthesized delay. Yet 
the improvements are not that remarkable as for the area 
decrease. The delay numbers seem to be closely related to 
the logical depth of the module. The logical depth has 
only decreased with 1 or 2 levels. For the DES algorithm 
the synthesized WDDL performs better then the bench-
mark implementation. This is not the case for the 2 other 
encryption algorithms.  
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Figure 13. DES algorithm: critical path delay of substi-
tution boxes 
  
Table II. AES and Kasumi algorithm: critical path 
delay of substitution boxes 
 original 
WDDL 
Differential 
synthesis 
synthesized 
WDDL 
AES-Sbox 17.95 13.66 14.98 
Kasumi-S7 15.31 11.24 11.57 
Kasumi-S9 14.46 9.96 11.25 
 
Compared to the single ended implementation, there is 
an increase of about a factor of 2 in time delay. The AES 
algorithm performs again better. The DPA proof imple-
mentation has only a 50% penalty in the time delay. 
In our experiments, the synthesis tool, which is used to 
find the clusters, used the default settings and minimized 
the time delay. Yet, some timing information is unavail-
able to the tool. The in- and outputs, which have been 
created by stripping the inverters from the design, are 
only virtual in- and outputs for the purpose of our synthe-
sis goals. The synthesis tool does not know this. The tool 
will optimize each path delay such that they are smaller 
then the user constraints. Yet eventually after the dou-
bling the LUT’s and reestablishing the connections, the 
delays are summed and may be larger than the original 
critical path the synthesis tool was optimizing for. There-
fore, it seems better to optimize for area. 
7 Conclusions 
We have presented a design methodology to synthesize 
secure DPA resistant logic for FPGA implementations. 
The methodology has been completely described and an 
exact implementation procedure has been provided.  
Experimental results have shown that compared with 
the original WDDL, the slice compaction offers a reduc-
tion of at least a factor of 2 in slice utilization. The gain in 
time delay depends largely on the algorithm and can go 
up to 30%. The methodology seems perfectly applicable 
for the AES algorithm. Compared with a single ended 
design, the overhead in time delay and slice utilization is 
restricted to a factor 1.5 and 1.9 respectively. 
Experiments have also shown that the synthesis meth-
odology achieves smaller utilization factor and time delay 
than a professional synthesize tool. 
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